In this paper, a distributed convex optimization framework is developed for energy trading between islanded microgrids. More specifically, the problem consists of several islanded microgrids that exchange energy flows by means of an arbitrary topology. Due to scalability issues, and in order to safeguard local information on cost functions, a subgradient-based cost minimization algorithm is proposed that converges to the optimal solution in a practical number of iterations and with a limited communication overhead. Furthermore, this approach allows for a very intuitive economics interpretation that explains the algorithm iterations in terms of "supply-demand model" and "market clearing". Numerical results are given in terms of convergence rate of the algorithm and attained costs for different network topologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Worldwide energy demand is expected to increase steadily over the incoming years, driven by energy demands from humans, industries and electrical vehicles: more precisely, it is expected that the growth will be in the order of 40% by year 2030. This demand is fueled by an increasingly energy-dependent lifestyle of humans, the emergence of electrical vehicles as the major source of transportation, and further automation of processes that will be facilitated by machines.
In today's power grid, energy is produced in centralized and large energy plants (macrogrid energy generation); then, the energy is transported to the end client, often over very large distances and through complex energy transportation meshes. Such a complex structure has a reduced flexibility and will hardly adapt to the demand growth, thus increasing the probability of grid instabilities and outages. The implications are enormous as demonstrated by recent outages in Europe and North America that have caused losses of millions of Euros [1] .
Given these problems at macro generation, it is of no surprise that a lot of efforts have been put into replacing or at least complementing macrogrid energy by means of local renewable energy sources. In this context, microgrids are emerging as a promising energy solution in which distributed (renewable) sources are serving local demand that does not surpass the secondary substation [2] . When local production cannot satisfy microgrid requests, energy is bought from the main utility. Microgrids are envisaged to provide a number of benefits: reliability in power delivery (e.g., by islanding), efficiency and sustainability by increasing the penetration of renewable sources, scalability and investment deferral, and the provision of ancillary services.
From this list, the capability of islanding [3] - [5] deserves special attention. Islanding is one of the highlighted features of microgrids and refers to the ability to disconnect some loads from the main grid and energize them exclusively via local energy resources. Intended islanding will be executed in those situations where the main grid cannot support the aggregated demand and/or operators detect some major grid problem that may potentially degenerate into an outage. In these cases, the microgrid can provide enough energy to guarantee, at least, a basic electrical service. The connection to the main grid will be restored as soon as the entire system stabilizes again.
In order to improve system capabilities, a typical approach is to consider the case where several microgrids exchange energy to one another (i.e., there exist microgrid-to-microgrid energy flows). In this context, the optimal power flow problem has recently attracted considerable attention (see [6] and references therein). Due to the fact that centralized solutions may suffer from scalability [7] and privacy issues, distributed approaches based on optimization tools have been proposed in [8] , [9] and more recently in [6] , [10] . In general, the optimal power flow problem is nonconvex and, thus, an exact solution may be too complex to compute. For this reason, suboptimal approaches are often adopted. As an example, references [10] , [11] show that semidefinite relaxation (see [12] for further details on this technique) can, in some cases, help to approximate the global optimal solution with high precision.
In this paper, conversely to the aforementioned works, we consider an abstract model that allows us to focus on the trading process rather than on the electrical operations of the grid. In terms of trading, the massive spread of microgrids is expected to drive the transition from the today's oligopolistic market to a more open and flexible one [13] . Extending the 2-microgrid case of [14] , [15] to the more general M -microgrid case, we consider a setting in which: (i) each microgrid has an associated energy generation cost; (ii) there exists a cost imposed by the distribution network operator for transferring energy between adjacent microgrids; and (iii) each microgrid has an associated power demand that must be satisfied. Under these considerations, we aim to find the optimal amounts of energy to be exchanged by the microgrids in order to minimize the total operational cost of the system (energy production and transportation costs). Of course, a possible approach would be to solve the optimization problem by means of a central controller with global information of the system. However, such a centralized solution presents a number of drawbacks since microgrids might be operated by different utilities and information on production costs cannot be disclosed. Therefore, in order to safeguard critical information on local cost functions and make the system more scalable, we propose an algorithm based on dual decomposition that iteratively solves the problem in a distributed manner. Interestingly, each iteration of the resulting algorithm has a straightforward interpretation in economical terms, once the new operational variables we introduce are given the meaning of energy prices. First, each microgrid locally computes the amounts of energy it must produce, buy and sell to minimize its local cost according to the current energy prices. Then, after exchanging the microgrid bids, a regulation phase follows in which, in a distributed way, the energy prices are adjusted according to the law of demand. This two-step process iterates until a global agreement is reached about prices and transferred energies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II we present the system model. Next, Section III shows how the distributed optimization framework provides a solution for the local subproblems and gives an interpretation from an economical point of view. Finally, in Sections IV and V, we present the numerical results and draw some conclusions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a system composed of M interconnected µG's operating in islanded mode. During each scheduling interval, each microgrid µG-i generates E (g) i units of energy 1 and consumes E (c) i later on, however, that the proposed distributed and iterative minimization algorithm opens to a wider-sense interpretation where achieving the global objective implies a cost reduction at every µG.
A. The cost functions
As mentioned before, the algorithm proposed hereafter works with any set of generation/transfer cost functions, as long as they all satisfy some mild convexity constraints. Specifically, it is required that {C i (·)} and γ(·) are positive valued, monotonically increasing, convex and twice differentiable. Even though these requirements may seem abstract and distant from real systems, one should take into account that the cost function of a common electrical generator (as, e.g., oil, coal, nuclear,. . . ) is often modeled as a quadratic polynomial
, where the coefficients a, b and c depend on the generator type, see [16] and, especially [17] . Such a generation model clearly satisfies our assumptions and, without available counterexamples, we extended it to the transfer cost function γ(·).
It is worth commenting here that the assumptions on the cost functions also allow for a simple way to introduce upper bounds on the energy generated by the µG's or supported by the transfer connections. Indeed, as opposed to adding hard constraints to the minimization problem in (3), one can introduce soft constraints by designing the cost function with a steep rise at the nominal maximum value. This expedient avoids further complexity in the problem analysis and gives more flexibility to the system: when needed, a µG can produce more energy than the nominal maximum if it is willing to pay an (significant) extra cost. Indeed, this situation arises in practical systems when backup generators are activated.
III. ITERATIVE DISTRIBUTED MINIMIZATION
A. Decentralizing the problem Problem (3) is known to have a unique minimum point since both the objective function and the constraints are strictly convex. However, dealing with M (M −1) unknowns can be very involved (the solution for the 2-µG case can be found in [14] ). Moreover, a centralized solution would require a control unit that is aware of all the system characteristics. This fact implies a considerable amount of data traffic to gather all the information and can miss some privacy requirements, since µG's may prefer to keep production costs and quantities private. To avoid these issues, we propose here a distributed iterative approach that reaches the minimum cost by decomposing the problem into M local, reduced-complexity subproblems solved by the µG's with little information about the rest of the system.
1) Identifying local subproblems:
In order to decompose (3) into M µG subproblems, let us rewrite it in the following equivalent form Due to the convexity properties of the primal problem (3) (or, equivalently, (4)), one can find the minimum cost by relaxing the M coupling constraints and solving the dual problem
where
In the last definition, which is a local minimization subproblem given the parameters λ, we introduced
that is the contribution of µG-i to the Lagrangian function relative to (4) . The parameter vector λ = λ 1 · · · λ M T gathers all the Lagrange multipliers λ i corresponding to the coupling constraints ε 
. Then, the Lagrange multipliers are updated according to
where α[k] is a positive step factor. Also, recall from (2) that the set of vectors {E (s) i } can be readily derived knowing the set {E 3) Interpretation-Market clearing: Algorithm 1 summarizes the distributed minimization procedure. One can readily notice that all necessary data is computed at the µG's, with no need for an external, centralized control unit. The information exchanged by the µG's is limited to the Lagrange multipliers {λ i } and the demanded energies {E j,i }, computed at µG-i and communicated only to the corresponding µG-j. Both privacy and traffic limitations are hence satisfied.
As commented before, this algorithm allows for an interesting interpretation: each Lagrange multiplier λ i may be understood as the price per energy unit requested by µG-i to sell energy to its neighbors. Then, the Lagrangian function (7) can be seen as the "net expenditure" (the opposite of the net income) for µG-i: each May 11, 2014 DRAFT Algorithm 1 Distributed approach
by solving (6) with fixed λ[k] µG-i informs µG-j, j = i, about the energy it is willing to buy, namely E j,i [k], at the given price λ j [k]
until convergence condition is verified µG pays for producing energy, for buying energy and for transporting the energy it buys. Conversely, the µG is payed for the energy it sells. By solving problem (6) , µG-i is thus maximizing its benefit for some given selling
, j = i) prices per energy unit. According to this view, the updating step (8) is clearing the market: prices should be modified until, globally, energy demand matches energy offer. Note that (8) i , then the selling price must increase and
B. The µG subproblem
In the previous section we have shown how the cost minimization problem (3) can be solved by means of successive iterations between the solution of local problems (6) and the update of the Lagrange multipliers according to (8) . We will give now a closed-form solution to the local subproblem (6) to be solved by the generic µG-i.
In order to keep notation as simple as possible, and without loss of generality, we assume that the Lagrange multipliers {λ j }, j = i are ordered in increasing order, i.e.
Also, with some abuse of notation, we fix λ j = +∞ when a j,i = 0: as far as µG-i is concerned, the fact that there is no connection from µG-j to µG-i is equivalent to assume that the price of the energy sold by µG-j is too high to be worth buying. Besides, we will make use of the functions C i (·) and γ (·) (the first derivatives of the cost functions C i (·) and γ(·)) and of their inverse functions, respectively χ i (·) and Γ(·).
Depending on the values of the M Lagrange multipliers {λ i , {λ j } j =i }, the solution to the minimization subproblem (6) at µG-i behaves according to six different cases.
Case 1 (µG-i neither sells nor buys):
, then µG-i will decide to remain in a self-contained state and generate all and only the energy it consumes. Namely,
Case 2 (µG-i buys but neither generates nor sells): Let us assume that
Moreover, we can identify a partition {S * , S 0 } of {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i} that satisfies the following assumptions:
• it exists η > 0 such that May 11, 2014 DRAFT
• η is the unique positive solution to
Then, µG-i buys all and only the energy it consumes, i.e. it neither generates nor sells any energy. More specifically
Case 3 (µG-i generates and buys but does not sell): Let us assume that
. Moreover, we can identify a partition {S * , S 0 } of {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i} that satisfies the following assumptions:
• it exists η > 0 such that
Then, µG-i does not sell any energy. Furthermore, it buys some energy to supplement the local generator and feed all the loads. The exact amounts are as follows:
Case 4 (µG-i generates and sells but does not buy):
, then µG-i does not buy any energy. Conversely, it generates all the energy it needs plus some extra energy for the market.
More specifically,
Case 5 (µG-i sells and buys but does not generate): Assume that λ i ≤ C i (0) and λ min < λ i − γ (0). Also, let S * = {j : λ j < λ i − γ (0)}. Note that S * = ∅ since, at least, λ min ∈ S * . Then, µG-i does not generate any energy: it buys all the energy it consumes, plus some extra energy for the market, from all µG's in the set S * .
The exact amounts are as follows:
Case 6 (µG-i sells, buys and generates):
where we introduced the set S * = {j : λ j < λ i − γ (0)}. Then, the local generator is activated but µG-i also buys energy from all µG's in S * . After feeding all local loads with E
i , some extra energy is left for selling in the market:
Proof: The proof of these results is a cumbersome convex optimization exercise. From the KarushKuhn-Tucker conditions associated to (6) , one must suppose all the different cases above and realize that the corresponding assumptions are necessary for each given case. Furthermore, one can also derive the exact values of all energy flows. Once all cases have been considered, a careful inspection shows that the derived necessary conditions form a partition of the hyperplane {(λ i , {λ j } j =i )}. Hence, the condition are also sufficient, along with necessary, and the proof is concluded. All the details are given in the appendix.
As a final remark, note that we are assuming a positive load at the µG's, i.e. E 
C. Interpretation and summary
It is interesting to note that the optimal solution provided in the previous section has a straightforward interpretation in economical terms. To see this, let us assume that µG-i is generating an amount E (g) i of energy May 11, 2014 DRAFT at a cost
. Then, after a small variation on the generated energy, the new cost can be approximated by
In economics, the derivative
is called marginal cost (the cost of increasing infinitesimally the production) at E (g) i . Note that can be either positive (more energy is produced for, e.g., selling purposes) or negative (because, e.g., some energy is bought from outside). Analogously, γ (E j,i ) is the marginal transportation cost.
Bearing this in mind, let us focus on Case 1. By means of (7) and (9), one readily realizes that µG-i is not interested in selling energy since the selling price λ i is lower than the marginal production cost C i (E
(the last inequality is due to the convexity of C i (·)). Similarly, buying is not profitable either since the minimum energy price λ min is larger than the marginal benefit 2 C i (E i (λ * ) in (7), where λ * stands for the optimal point of (5). For the sake of brevity, we prove this result for Case 6 only, although the same reasoning holds true for the rest of cases. In Case 6, the "net expenditure" reads
where (ε
is now the minimum point of (6) for λ = λ * . Next, by means of the results of Case 6, one has λ *
) for all j ∈ S * . Then, the equation above can be rewritten as follows:
i − j∈S * E j,i . Finally, since the cost functions are monotonically increasing and convex, it turns out that C i (E (c)
) and γ(E j,i ) − γ (E j,i )E j,i < γ(0) = 0, which leads to the desired result.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
As for the numerical results, we have considered a system composed of four microgrids and, for simplicity, we have assumed the same generation cost function at all microgrids. More specifically, we have considered the U12 generator in [17] , whose quadratic cost function C(x) = a + bx + cx Fig. 2a shows the duality gap and the total cost of the system as a function of the iteration number. As we can observe, the algorithm converges (the duality gap is almost null) after a reasonable number of iterations. More interestingly, Fig. 2b shows the evolution of the selling prices. Note that the relationship between prices after convergence reflects the one between local loads: the more energy the µG consumes locally, the higher its selling price is. While this is a natural consequence of the generation cost function being strictly increasing (if the local load is low, the µG can generate extra energy for selling purposes at a lower cost), we can also see it as a manifestation of the law of demand. Indeed, the microgrid energy demand may be seen as composed by two terms, an internal one corresponding to the local loads and an external one from the other microgrids. The selling price will hence increase with the resulting total demand.
Next, in order to get some more insight into the evolution of prices and energy flows, we consider a scenario where all local loads are held constant at 11 MWh (just above E (g) max ), except for µG-4, whose load varies from 1 to 11 MWh. In Fig.'s 3a, 4 and 5, for the four microgrids, we report the local cost after convergence
, that is the minimum "net expenditure" (6), with λ * the maximum point of (5). For benchmarking purposes, we have also depicted the costs at each microgrid in the disconnected case (i.e. when no trading is performed, the dashed lines). As shown in Section III-C, when using (7) as the local cost, we can observe that optimal trading always brings some benefit (cost reduction) to all microgrids.
Let us now focus on the fully connected topology of Fig. 3 . In Fig. 3a we see that the cost attained by µG-4 after trading initially follows the cost of the disconnected microgrid. It is only when the local load grows above 6 MWh that the gain becomes noticeable, reaches its maximum for E (c) 4 ≈ 9 MWh and then decreases again until it becomes null at E (c) 4 = 11 MWh. There, all µG's have the same internal demand and, for symmetry reasons, there is no energy exchange. The gain, indeed, is a result of the energy sold by µG-4 to the other microgrids, whose amount, unit price and corresponding income is depicted in Fig. 3b . At first sight, it may be disconcerting to see that the negligible gain obtained by µG-4 for E (c) 4 < 6 MWh is the result of selling a large amount of energy at a very low price (both almost constant for E 4 , the high selling price cannot compensate for the decrease of sold energy and the income goes to zero.
To understand why this happens, let us consider µG-4. After convergence, µG-4 is defined by Case 4-generates and sells. Then, particularizing (7), the local costs at µG-4 is
where we used the fact that we are assuming C i (·) = C(·) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The optimal λ 4 = λ * 4 is given by the marginal cost, that is
Now, consider (10), (11) and recall that the cost function C(E 4 /3) and they are not exchanging energy to one another. Intuitively, µG-1 falls within Case 3-generates and buys-and its local cost is
The optimal price λ 4 = λ * 4 is given by (11) but, from µG-1 perspective, can also be rewritten as
Let us neglect, for the moment, the transfer cost function γ(·). Also, recall that C(·) is again the one depicted in Finally, let us recall that the purpose of the original problem (3) is to minimize the total cost of the system and not to maximize local benefits. This, together with the fact that we do not allow µG's to cheat, explains why µG-4 always sells at a unit price given by the marginal cost and does not look for extra gains. Even though the general ideas discussed above about the cost behaviors apply to all systems, connection topologies (see Fig. 1 ) other than the full connected one present some specific characteristics. For instance, Fig. 4 report the local cost for the four µG's in ring topology. We may see that µG-2 and µG-3 get some extra benefit from acting as intermediaries between µG-4 and µG-1.
To be more precise, after the trading process, the local solutions at µG-{2, 3} will fall within Case 6: energy is bought not only to satisfy internal needs but also to be resold to µG-1. By doing so, µG-{2, 3} can reduce their local cost substantially.
In Fig. 1c we depict another situation where topology heavily impacts on the costs. In this case, microgrids are connected by means of a line topology with µG-4 at the end of the line. Therefore, µG-3 can be regarded as the bottleneck of the system, since all the energy that goes from µG-4 to µG-{1,2} has to pass through it inevitably. As it can be observed in the figure, this situation benefits µG-3.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have addressed a problem in which several microgrids interact by exchanging energy in order to minimize the global operation cost, while still satisfying their local demands. In this context, we have proposed an iterative distributed algorithm that is scalable in the number of microgrids and keeps local cost functions and local consumption private. More specifically, each algorithm iteration consists of a local minimization step followed by a market clearing process. During the first step, each microgrid computes its local energy bid and reveals it to its potential sellers. Next, during the market clearing process, energy prices are adjusted according to the law of demand. As for the local optimization problem, it has been shown to have a closed form expression which lends itself to an economical interpretation. In particular, we have shown that no matter the local demand that a microgrid will be always willing to start the trading process since, eventually, its "net expenditure" will be lower than its local cost when operating on its own. Finally, numerical results have confirmed that the algorithm converges after a reasonable number of iterations and there certainly is a gain over nonconnected µG's which strongly depends on the energy demands and network topology.
APPENDIX A SOLUTION TO THE MICROGRID PROBLEM
This appendix proves the solution to the µG problem given in Section III-B. As explained before, we will suppose that the µG best option is to operate in one of the six different states defined according to whether the µG is (or is not) selling, buying and generating any energy, as described by the six cases of Section III-B. By doing so, one can compute all the energy values of interest and identify what constraints the prices {λ i , {λ j } j =i } must satisfy for the considered case to be feasible. After all cases have been considered, the six sets of necessary conditions should form a partition of the (λ i , {λ j } j =i ) hyperplane. Indeed, this fact implies that each set of conditions is sufficient, along with necessary, for the corresponding µG state and that the computed energy values are those minimizing the local cost function (7) for given prices {λ i , {λ j } j =i }.
Before delving into the different cases, some common preliminaries are needed. For the local problem (6) the Lagrangian function is as follows:
where we have introduced the Lagrange multipliers η, ω and
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By recalling the definition of A in Section II, the elements of the gradient in (13b) can be written in a much simpler form, namely
The derivation of the six possible solutions given in Section III-B is based on the analysis of the KKT conditions above, as explained hereafter.
A. Proof of Case 1
Let us suppose that the solution of the minimization problem tells us that the µG neither sells nor buys any energy, that is ε
i . If this was the case, then the KKT conditions (13) would write
The first condition implies
, while the second condition yields
which are the two necessary conditions corresponding to Case 1.
B. Proof of Case 2
We now look for the necessary conditions for Case 2, that is µG-i sells no energy (i.e. ε (s) i = 0) and buys energy from at least another µG (i.e. ∃j = 1, . . . , M, j = i : E j,i > 0). Besides, µG-i generates no energy and
The KKT conditions (13) simplify to
where we have introduced the sets S * = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and E j,i > 0}, S 0 = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and E j,i = 0}.
May 11, 2014 DRAFT
The first necessary condition λ i ≤ C i (0) is a straightforward consequence of (14a) and (14d). Next, for all j ∈ S * , (14a) and (14b) imply
which means that
Similarly, because of (14a) and (14c), one has
By comparing the last two inequalities, one sees that λ j < λ k for all j ∈ S * , k ∈ S 0 , meaning that λ min = min j =i λ j is certainly part of the set S * when this solution is correct.
From (15), and taking (16) into account, we can infer that
where Γ(·) is the inverse of γ (·), which exists because of the continuity and convexity assumptions on the cost function γ(·). Since we are supposing that the optimal working point satisfies E (c)
Given that Γ(·) is an increasing function, and recalling (16), it can be easily shown that equation (17) in the variable η has a unique solution, whose value allows us to compute the energies E j,i bought from neighbor µG-j, j ∈ S * (compare with the statement of Case 2).
To derive the other necessary conditions for this case, let us focus on (17) . Since Γ(·) is a non-negative function and λ j = λ min ⇒ j ∈ S * , it follows:
Recalling that Γ(·) is the inverse of γ (·), this implies 0 ≤ η ≤ γ E (c) i
is a necessary condition for Case 2. Now, let S † = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and λ j < λ i − γ (0)}, which is a subset of S * because of (16) . Then, by comparison with (17),
where the second inequality is a consequence of Γ(·) being an increasing function. Also, we are letting η → 0, which is possible since λ i −λ j > γ (0) for the considered j. In particular, if
i , as reported in Case 2. We will see later that this condition is important to identify the boundary between the solution regions of Case 2 and Case 5.
Consider now (14a) and (16) , which give
and, in turn, a new necessary condition:
May 11, 2014 DRAFT Fig. 6 . Graphical representation of inequality (19) and of the solution η = η * to
Without loss of generality, we assume here that
Moreover, (14a) and (17) yield
Substituting into (17), we can write the last necessary condition of Case 2, namely j∈S *
Note that the left-hand side has a meaning according to (18) . The last inequality may also be deduced from the graphical representation in Fig. 6 .
C. Proof of Case 3
We suppose again a solution where ε (s) i = 0 and E j,i > 0 for at least one j = 1, . . . , M, j = i. As opposed to the previous case, however, we also suppose that E (c)
> 0, i.e. µG-i produces some energy.
With this solution, the Lagrange multiplier ω is zero and the KKT conditions become
where, again, S * = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and E j,i > 0},
Condition (21a) directly gives the first requirement for the case in hand, namely λ i < C i (E (c) i ). Next, by combining (21a) and (21c), one has λ i − λ j + η − γ (0) + µ j = 0 and, hence,
since µ j ≥ 0. Similarly, (21a) and (21b) yield λ i − λ j + η − γ (E j,i ) = 0, which implies
since γ (·) is an increasing function, and
where Γ(·) is the inverse of γ (·). Inequality (23) guarantees that E j,i is positive. Following, by injecting (24) into (21a), it turns out that η must satisfy
It is straightforward to show that the last equation in η admits a unique solution (see also the graphical representation in Fig. 7 ) that allows us to compute the energies bought from neighbor microgrids according to (24), as stated by Case 3. Also, knowing η and recalling that χ i (·) is the inverse function of
allows us to compute the generated energy
Combining (25) with (23), we get λ j + γ (0) < C i (E (c) i ) for all λ j , j ∈ S * and in particular for λ min = min j λ j (see the statement of Case 3). We are particularly interested in λ min since the corresponding microgrid will certainly belong to the set S * (and possibly be its only element) if this case is the solution to the minimization problem. This can be deduced by comparing (22) and (23).
Another necessary condition for this solution can be derived by noting that E (c)
From (25) one further has η > C i (0) − λ i . Then, again because of Γ(·) being increasing in η,
and, equivalently,
i , where we have introduced S ‡ = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and λ j < C i (0) − γ (0)} ⊆ S * (see also Fig. 7 ). In particular, if S ‡ = S * then j∈S * Γ C i (0) − λ j < E (c) i , which represents the complementary set of (20) in Case 2. Fig. 7 . Graphical representation of inequality (26) and of the solution η = η * to η
Note that, as η increases, a new mode is activated each time a point λ j − λ i + γ (0) is crossed.
Finally, let S † = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and λ j < λ i − γ (0)}. Then, 
D. Proof of Case 4
The next potential solution provides E j,i = 0 for all j = i (µG-i does not buy any energy), ε i ) (the first necessary condition for the current case). Moreover, combining both conditions, we get µ j = λ j + γ (0) − λ j , which requires λ j ≥ λ i − γ (0) (the second necessary condition for the current case) in order to have µ j ≥ 0.
The value taken by ε where we have introduced the sets S * = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and E j,i > 0}, S 0 = {j = 1, . . . , M : j = i and E j,i = 0}.
Condition (29a) directly implies λ i > C i (0) (the first necessary condition for Case 6) because of the convexity assumptions on C(·). Also, for all j ∈ S 0 , the Lagrangian multipliers µ j are given by (29a) and (29c), namely µ j = λ j − λ i + γ (0). This value is non-negative only if
On the other hand, (29a) and (29b) lead to λ i − λ j − γ (E j,i ) = 0 for all j ∈ S * . This identity allows us to express the quantity E j,i = Γ(λ i − λ j ) (the desired result), with Γ(·) the inverse of γ(·), provided that λ j < λ i − γ (0) for all j ∈ S * . This requirement, together with (30), results in the definition of S * for Case 6, namely j ∈ S * ⇔ λ j < λ i − γ (0).
To conclude, by means of the function χ i (·), inverse of C i (·), (29a) is equivalent to E figure only represents a slice at a given (λ i , λ min )-plane: this is enough to identify most of the boundaries, which only depend on these two parameters. Some boundaries (the dashed ones), however, depend on all {λ j } and cannot be represented properly.
